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Abstract
Zwei popu lis ti sche Par tei en – Samoo bro na Rzeczpos po li tej
Pol skiej ( Selbst ver tei di gung  der Repub lik  Polen,  SRP )  und
Liga Pol skich Rod zin ( Liga  der Pol ni schen Fami li en,  LPR )
erran gen  bei  den pol ni schen Par la ments wah len  von 2001
einen spek ta ku lä ren  Erfolg,  der  es  ihnen  nicht  nur erlaub -
te,  in  den  Sejm, son dern  auch  in  eine Koa li ti ons re gie rung
ein zu zie hen.  Doch erlit ten bei de For ma tio nen 2007  eine
schwe re Wahl nie der la ge  und ver schwan den  nach  den
Euro pa wah len  von 2009 fak tisch  von  der poli ti schen Büh -
ne. Die ser Bei trag ana ly siert  und  erklärt –  unter Rück griff
auf  das  Modell  des „Spie gel bil des“ –  die Grün de  für  Erfolg
und Schei tern  der bei den Par tei en.  Es  wird  die Auf fas sung
ver tre ten,  dass  das sozi al  - öko no mi sche  und poli ti sche Kli -
ma,  die Struk tur  des pol ni schen Par tei en sys tems,  die Mus -
ter inner par tei li chen Wett be werbs  wie  auch  die Ver or tung
der popu lis ti schen Par tei en  auf  der Regie rung  - Oppo si ti on -
Achse  die wich tigs ten Erklä rungs fak to ren  für  Erfolg  wie
Schei tern lie fern. Darü ber  hinaus  erwies  sich  die popu lis ti -
sche Iden ti tät  als  in  hohem  Maße bedeut sam.  Ihre Beson -
der heit  wird  mit  den „ zwei Gesich tern“  des pol ni schen
Popu lis mus  und  der Kom bi na ti on  von ver ti ka ler  und hori -
zon ta ler Exklu si on  zu erfas sen ver sucht.
For over a quarter of a century populism has been in the center of political sci-
ence research. Though we have undoubtedly come closer to understand the
essence of this phenomenon, there are still parts of it which cannot be explained
even by the most comprehensive theories or approaches. As R.B. Collier notices,
“The populist label has been attached to such a wide variety of political move-
ments (right and left, from above and from below ) that it is hard to stabilize any
core meaning that can work rigorously as an analytical concept.”1 The reality of
Poland after 1989 fully confirms this observation. It is difficult to find unques-
tionable criteria according to which any given political party could be defined as
populist. Thus, existing analyses have acknowledged the Polish People’s Party
(Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe, PSL ),2 the Confederation of Independent Poland
( Konfederacja Polski Niepodległej, KPN ), and Law and Justice (Prawo i Spra -
wiedliwość, PiS )3 as populist parties.
It seems that in most cases the populism of these parties is identified rather
with demagogy, and the only parties truly deserving the populist label are Self
Defence of the Republic of Poland ( SRP ) and the League of Polish Families
(LPR), both having emerged as parliamentary groups after the elections of 2001.
Both parties were characterized by exclusion, so typical for populist groups,
which is reflected by two dimensions : the vertical one ( which excludes the elite
from any variously - interpreted people or nation ) and the horizontal one ( exclud-
ing all “others” that do not fit into an established homogeneous community ).
The present article aims, firstly, to find the causes of the spectacular success
of SRP and the LPR – their entrance into the Sejm in 2001, their success in the
elections to the European Parliament ( EP ) in 2004, their entrance into the gov-
ernment in 2005. Secondly, it explores the causes of the parties’ later defeat – in
the 2007 elections and in the elections to the EP in 2009. We argue that, among
many other factors, the three main causes of both success and the defeat were as
follows :
– the socioeconomic and political climate which was favorable for populists in
2001 and 2005, yet unfavorable in 2007 and 2009;
– the placement of the populist parties on the Opposition - Government axis. In
2001 and 2005 SRP and LPR were both parties of the Opposition, which
allowed them to openly criticize the ruling elite and the status quo in the con-
text of vertical and horizontal dimensions of exclusion. With the parties’
entrance into government in 2005 such criticism was no longer possible. Its
lacking undermined the dominant aspects of their populist identity;
– changes in the structure of the Polish party system and in the models of inter -
party competition. At the time of the 2001 elections, the populists took advan-
tage of new opportunities offered by the Polish political scene – the decline of
large political groups ( especially of the Solidarity Electoral Action – AWS )
and the creation of a new political configuration. As early as the 2005 elec-
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3 See Stefan Stępień, Populizm w programach wyborczych do parlamentu w 2001 r. In :
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czy pułapka dla współczesnych społeczeństwa ?, Toruń 2006, pp. 166–170.
tions and fully after the 2007 elections, there was a tendency for a bi - polariza-
tion of the Polish political scene between the Civic Platform ( Platforma
Obywatelska, PO ) and PiS. As this tendency increased, it proved fatal for the
smaller political parties, including the populists.
We have consciously conducted our analysis according to a “mirror image”
model of causes for the parties’ success and defeat. We have analyzed both of
these aspects in terms of an identical configuration of causes; this has allowed
for a more understandable verification of those causes.
We have also consciously chosen to provide a separate discussion concerning
elections to the European Parliament ( EP ), analyzing both the successes of the
populist parties in these elections (2004) and their defeat ( EP elections 2009).
Elections to the European Parliament are peculiar : they have a second - order
nature, meaning that they draw less attention and interest; provide less motiva-
tion for political parties, their candidates, and their voters; and above all are
characterized by a comparatively smaller voter turnout.4 Political parties treat
European Parliamentary elections rather as tests of social moods and of their
own mobilization capabilities than as meaningful battles for political positions.
This analysis shows that, in the case of the populist parties in question, the fac-
tors that conditioned their results in the EP elections were secondary to the fac-
tors that appeared in the earlier general elections of 2001 and 2007.
I. SRP and LPR – Political Parties and Their Identities
The LPR and Self Defence entered the Polish parliament at the same time in
2001; both lost their parliamentary status in the elections of 2007. The fates of
these two groups seem to suggest a wide range of similarities. Indeed, what the
two parties actually had in common were their populist natures and the same
small potential for forming a coalition. Both parties were doomed to isolation in
the Sejm from 2001 to 2005, and during their coalition with the PiS between
2006 and 2007 they were treated as second-rate partners. Yet it seems that the
main similarities between the LPR and SRP end here; their differences become
visible when we analyze the circumstances of each party’s emergence, their
respective styles of political activism, and especially when we compare the politi-
cal values at the source of their ideological identities.
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Conceptual Framework for the Analysis of European Election Results. In : European
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1. Self Defense of the Republic of Poland 
Self Defence was registered as a political party on 4th November 1999. As an
agricultural trade union, however, it had already existed since 1992. This official
status of a union was merely a cover; running regularly in elections from 1993
onwards, the group displayed predominant attributes of a political party.5 The
founder, and as yet the only leader of the trade union - turned - political party is
Andrzej Lepper, a farmer from Zielonowo in the Pomerania ( Pomorze ) region of
Poland. Gifted with unquestionable charisma, it is Lepper who has provided the
SRP with its leadership character.
The success met by Lepper’s party, first in the elections of 2001 and then four
years later ( see table 1), made some individuals entertain the idea that SRP
could become a ruling party in the country.6 This idea became even more justi-
fied as the party achieved somewhat better results in the elections of 2005. The
antagonism between the PO and PiS , which had grown during the campaigning
periods for the Sejm and the Presidency in 2005, made it impossible for these
parties to form a previously intended coalition. This impossibility opened up the
opportunity for SRP and the LPR to form a government coalition with PiS in
May, 2006. During Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz’s and ( from 14.7.2006) Jarosław
Kaczyński’s respective terms as Prime Minister, SRP held three ministerial posi-
tions, with Andrzej Lepper functioning as both the Minister of Agriculture and a
deputy - prime minister.7
A chronically tense situation in the coalition forced SRP to break away from it
in September 2006; but after three weeks Lepper’s party returned to the govern-
ment. The tension, nevertheless, did not dissolve, and the coalition’s breakdown
came on 9th July 2007. Lepper requested his own dismissal and formally
announced the end of the coalition two weeks later. After the early elections of
2007 SRP lost its parliamentary status, and from that time on we have observed
a gradual disintegration of the party’s structures.
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6.5.2006, p. 1.
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Table 1: Results of SRP in elections to the SEJM (lower house of parliament) in
2001, 2005, and 2007
Elections Percentage of votes Number of votes Number of mandates
1993 2.78 383,97 0
1997 0.08 10,07 0
2001 10.20 1,327,624 53
2005 11.41 1,347,355 56
2007 1.53 247,34 0
2. The League of Polish Families 
The LPR came into being in early June 2001 as the result of combining certain
smaller groups from a Catholic - national environment. Its emergence and success
in the 2001 elections was greatly influenced by Radio Maryja, whose leader was
the charismatic redemptorist Tadeusz Rydzyk.8
It was in the LPR where several well - known, eager - to - conflict, radical
Catholic - national politicians found their place ( Zygmunt Wrzodak, Gabriel
Janowski, Adam Biela, Antoni Macierewicz, Ryszard Bender, and Jan Łopusza-
ński ).9 As a compromise, the little - known politician Marek Kotlinowski was cho-
sen as party leader.10
After the elections in 2001, however, it was Roman Giertych who played the
leading role in the party. Giertych came from the small, nationalistic National
Party ( Stronnictwo Narodowe ), which saw itself as a continuation of the pre -
World War II political party of the same name, whose head – Roman Dmowski –
had been one of the best - known politicians of that time.11
The success of the LPR in the 2001 elections was even greater if we consider
that none of the other groups in its earlier coalition made it into parliament that
year – neither the Christian Democtratic Solidarity Electoral Action ( Akcja
Wyborcza Solidarność – AWS ) or the liberal Freedom Union ( Unia Wolności –
UW ). The LPR achieved phenomenal results in the elections to the European
Parliament in 2004, followed by the parliamentary elections in 2005, in which
the party maintained its results on the same level as in the previous elections ( see
Source: http://www.pkw.gov.pl/pkw2/index.jsp?place=Menu01&news_cat_id=22&layout=1.
128 Aufsätze / Articles
12 Giertych resigned from all party functions in the LPR. See Polska Scena Polityczna, 20
(2007), p. 10.
13 The following authors consider populism an ideology. See for example : Mark N.
Hagopian, Ideas and Ideologies of Modern Politics, New York 1985, p. 198. Jasper de
Raadt / David Hollanders / Andre Krouwel, Varieties of Populism. An Analysis of the
programmatic character of six European Parties, Paper presented at the Dutch -
Flemish Politicolgenetemaal, 27–28 May 2004, Antwerp, Belgium.
14 See Paul Taggart, Populism, Buckingham / Philadelphia 2000, p. 1–9; Hans - George
Betz, Rechtspopulismus in Westeuropa. Aktuelle Entwicklungen und politische
Bedeutung. In : Osterreichische Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft, 3 (2002), pp. 251–
265; Michael Minkenberg, The Radical Right in Postsocialist Central and Eastern
Europe : Comparative Observations and Interpretations. In : East European Politics
and Societies, 16 (2002), pp. 335–363.
Table 2: Results of the LPR in elections to the Sejm ( lower house of parliament)
in the years 2001, 2005, and 2007
Elections
Percentage of 
votes
Number of 
votes
Number of 
mandates
To the Sejm 2001 7.87 1,025,148 38
To the Sejm 2005 7.97 940,76 34
To the Sejm 2007 1.30 209,17 0
Source: http://www.pkw.gov.pl/pkw2/index.jsp?place=Menu01&news_cat_id=22&layout=1.
table 2). Entering into a government coalition with PiS and SRP, the LPR
received two ministerial positions, one of which ( the Ministry of National
Education ) belonged to Giertych who had also become deputy - prime minister.
After losing in the following parliamentary elections, on 24th October 2007
Roman Giertych resigned from his post as chairman of the LPR; the result was a
weakening of the party, which consequently suffered a crisis in terms of its lead-
ership. Ultimately, after a futile two - years search for a suitable candidate, the lit-
tle - known Witold Bałażak became the party’s leader in October 2009.12 Still,
Giertych is considered the man behind the party. The structures within the LPR
rapidly disintegrated after the elections in 2007. As the last elections to the
European Parliament have clearly shown, the party is currently unable to organ-
ize effective campaigns on a national scale.
3. Do the SRP and LPR have ideologies ?
It is a debatable issue whether, at its source, populism possesses any coherent
system of ideas which could be called an “ideology”13 or whether it is rather a
certain style of action, means of political discourse, or a strategy used by differ-
ent ideologies.14 In any case, it is a phenomenon characterized by a defined set
of properties, one that may be called a “syndrome”. The identity of a populist
party is built on opposition to “others” through their exclusion. The people ( the
nation ) are perceived as “we” – an internally homogeneous collective, separated
not only from a “they” – elites ( vertical exclusion ), but also from all “other” indi-
viduals and collectives ( horizontal exclusion ). For populist parties politics is an
expression of the general will of the people. Populism is additionally character-
ized by a unique organizational structure, based on such things as charismatic
leadership and a particular way of conducting political discourse (for instance,
through highly - emotionalized speeches and by inspiring fear among the audi-
ences ). Populist parties may make references to a wide variety of ideologies that,
as a bonus, give them authority and justify their identities – but such references
are optional. What most starkly differentiated SRP and the LPR, were, in fact,
their attitudes towards ideology. This observation allows us to differentiate two
types of Polish populism, represented respectively by Self Defence and the
League of Polish Families.
SRP was a formation that was basically not ideological;15 it built its identity
more on social myths than on political ideas. It was characterized by a lack of a
stable position regarding most of the issues it dealt with as well as a lack of fixed
principles on which those issues were founded. In consequence, the party’s polit-
ical program, along with content expressed by SRP politicians, was extremely
disordered and inconsistent. To some degree this was a result of the “leadership”
nature of the party itself, and so SRP’s position was articulated predominantly
by Andrzej Lepper.
Connected to this was Lepper’s characteristic ornamentation of political sub-
ject matter and the obvious absurdity of his statements. His speeches, especially
the earlier ones, can be described as having great emotional weight and minimal
meaningful content. They showed weakness, or even a lack of intellectual back-
ground. Andrzej Lepper consequently became not only the person who
expressed his party’s position, but also a spontaneous creator of that position.16
SRP’s “program” was based on a collection of postulates which not only failed to
create a coherent whole but were often self - contradictory. However, it was this
self - contradiction that actually allowed for a flexible adjustment of the party’s
position to the political situation.17
The reason why some researchers attributed leftist characteristics to SRP was
because it had the nature of a radical protest party, whose rhetoric was based pri-
marily on social and economic postulates; the party itself aspired to the role of a
“defender of the oppressed”. These postulates were aimed at attracting a partic-
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ular electorate and did not grow out of a definitive ideological structure which
could be identified with either socialism or social democracy. 
The same was true for issues of world view, including SRP’s approach toward
the country, religion, or the idea of the nation. What made Lepper’s party truly
different from the LPR, in this sense, was the fact that SRP was, in its own way,
religiously indifferent – a factor that may have also caused some to assign it left-
ist characteristics ( although Lepper described himself as a faithful Catholic and
often made references to the words of the Pope ). On the other hand, SRP
showed some elements usually associated with radical right parties, such as
xenophobia ( especially towards Germans ) and a kind of “social conservatism”.
Yet these traits do not form a coherent system that would allow us to classify
Lepper’s party as a right - wing formation.
At a later time, especially when SRP became anchored as a parliamentary
group, its leaders made an attempt at an ideological description of the party.
Interestingly, they tried to do this on the basis of the socio - liberal category of the
“Third Way”, by referring to reformist concepts of social democracy.18 Yet SRP’s
interpretation of the “Third Way” had little to do with Blairism, or even with the
“Third Way” concept itself. The party’s references to the “Third Way” rather
aimed at creating an effective party image rather instead of being an attempt at
self - description based on a leftist identity. 
Things looked quite different within the LPR. The party had gained its ideo-
logical identity from two sources : the national - democratic environment ( to
which the Giertychs belonged )19 and the Catholic - national environment ( that of
Radio Maryja ). All in all, this made for a rather coherent system of values based
on a principle - driven approach to questions concerning the state, the nation,
and religion. The LPR treated these issues in a traditional way : the state was the
only accepted political organization of the nation; the nation was seen as an eth-
nic community; religion ( Catholic ) was the main ingredient in the cultural iden-
tity of the nation. From these values there emerged, among other things, a defin-
itively negative standpoint towards European integration. Until the time of the
referendum for accession to the EU in 2003, “Euroscepticism” was the discern-
ing mark of the LPR.20
The League – in contrast to SRP – was not strictly an “anti - establishment”
party. Although such attitudes did show up within the party’s ranks, they were
still overshadowed by the one fundamental trait of the LPR – nationalism. The
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party’s anti-establishment slogans (especially between 2001 and 2005) were due
to the conviction that the Polish elites were conducting “anti - Polish” politics,
especially in terms of integration with the EU. In the first period of the LPR’s
existence, when a major role was played by politicians connected with Radio
Maryja, the party displayed radical Catholicism, and among other things on this
basis it spread on convictions of the cultural gap between Poland and Western
Europe. The populism of the LPR was inextricably linked to the essential “funda-
mentalism” of the national ideology the party expressed, which often took on a
xenophobic dimension.21
4. Populism
Populist parties in Central and Eastern European countries show certain traits
which visibly differentiate them from populist groups in Western Europe. In the
case of the latter, populism is associated ( mainly, but not only ) with the category
of radical right - wing parties. It appears that varying historical, cultural, and eco-
nomic conditions make up the basis for these differences. What truly draws
one’s attention in the case of the Western European populist parties is their anti-
immigration standpoint.22 In Poland, as in the majority of Central and Eastern
European countries, the “problem” of immigration remains insignificant.
The following two factors were primarily responsible for the uniqueness of
Polish populism and, at the same time, caused the development of its two cur-
rents :
– the historical and religious specificity of Poland which – on the one hand –
makes the issue of the nation’s sovereignty a very sensitive one and – on the
other hand – leads to accepting the Catholic religion as the fundamental ele-
ment constituting the national identity of the Polish people. These elements
were decisive in establishing the specificity of the LPR’s populism.
– a very large percentage of peasants ( including farmers ) in the Polish popula-
tion and, consequently, the enormous electoral significance of a traditionalist,
politically uneducated, and economically weak electorate. These elements
were decisive in establishing the specificity of SRP.
Cas Mudde, in one of his earlier publications, distinguishes three categories of
populism in post - Communist countries : agrarian, economic, and political. While
he acknowledges the first two categories as signs of anachronistic vestiges in the
socioeconomic structures of Central European societies ( i.e. strong farming
groups or the industrial proletariat ), the third type of populism ( political ) is an
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entirely contemporary “product” – which is why political parties of this type
exist in both Eastern and Western Europe. Mudde defines the concept of politi-
cal populism as “a political style that builds upon a rigid dichotomy of ‘the pure
people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite.’”23
It seems that whereas the character of SRP has shown all the signs of agrarian
populism, the populism of the LPR goes beyond the typological framework pro-
posed by Mudde. The LPR does not fit precisely into any of the categories
described above.24 What is more, SRP, in addition to its agrarian character, visi-
bly displays characteristics of political populism ( anti - establishment by nature ). 
The LPR, while remaining close to Western European movements of a “right
populist” nature, grew out of a peculiar national ground. In this sense, the
League’s populism was not only a reaction to the changes associated with the
challenges of globalization. Above all, it was a means of defending an anachro-
nistic, historical vision of a state and nation “threatened” by the pro cesses of
modernization ( such as the laicization of society, secularization of the state and
the weakening of the state’s power to the advantage of other ruling bodies in
both domestic and international policy ). 
The main problem that has emerged with analyses of Polish populism after
2001 concerns the difficulty in defining it in terms of ideological criteria on the
left - right axis. Whereas categorizing the LPR as a right - wing populist party does
not cause any doubt or surprise, attempts at definitively labeling the SRP as left
or right populist is problematic. The eclectic identity of the party, as indicated
above, justifies considering SRP a left - wing party by some political scientists,25
and a right - wing party by others.26 It seems that although Self Defense veers
more in the direction of leftist parties, the most appropriate proposition would
be to resign from categorizing the party in terms of ideology27 and to accept that
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24 It is worth noting that Mudde’s analysis was published in 2000, before the emergence
of the LPR.
25 See for example : Andrzej Antoszewski, Partie Polityczne Europy Środkowej i
Wschodniej, Poznań / Wrocław 2005, p. 180–181; Kai - Olaf Lang, Populismus in
Ostmitteleuropa. Manifestationsformen Besonderheiten und Chancen Strukturę. In :
Rudolf von Thadden / Anna Hofmann ( eds.), Populismus in Europa – Krise der
Demokratie ?, Göttingen 2005, p. 142–143. 
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27 Cas Mudde points out the difficulty in locating SRP on the left - right axis – for this rea-
son he suggests acknowledging it as simply a “social populist party”. However, the
author ( p. 30) – in contradiction to this – defines social populism as a phenomenon
which “combine[ s ] socialism and populism as [ its ] core ideological features.” Cas
Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe, Cambridge 2007, pp. 48, 52, 280.
SRP is a basically non - ideological formation. SRP identity was firstly formed by
its populist character, which became primarily manifest by criticism of the
Establishment, and not so much in an ideological package of political values.
The situation was different for the LPR, which was a populist party with a dis-
tinctively ideological core and right - wing character from its inception. The differ-
ence between the two parties, therefore, was not primarily in ideological varia-
tions but in the fact that whereas the LPR had an ideology, SRP did not. What
they had in common, in fact, was the plane of populism. As mentioned above, it
makes no difference whether the form of populism adopted by a given party has
ideological or non - ideological sources; various populist parties share certain
common traits, especially in the dimension of vertical and horizontal exclusion. 
As already stated, the vertical dimension involves setting a ( variously inter-
preted ) collective of people or a nation ( “us” ) against a ruling elite ( “them” ).
What, according to the LPR, defined “the people”, was Polish national identity,
so for them “us” was the Polish nation. For SRP, “us” consisted of all weak,
poor, and unemployed workers, especially farmers. On the other hand, in the
vertical dimension populists separate themselves from all people, nationalities,
organizations, processes or institutions that they perceive as “alien” or “other”.
Any joining of “others” to the people or the nation is put into question, as those
“others” may pose a threat to the good or unity of the nation. Thus, the LPR and
SRP both protested against globalization, the EU, foreign capital, and the media
(among other things ), and SRP especially stood against liberals and capitalists.
Although both levels of exclusion are clearly visible with both the LPR and SRP,
it should be stressed that Self Defence embodied vertical exclusion to a higher
degree ( through anti - elitism ), while the League of Polish Families more strongly
embodied the horizontal one ( through nationalism ).
II. On the Way to the Top
Variables conditioning the rise and success of populist parties are of a multi -
faceted nature and are very complex. In the literature of political science we may
find various approaches to explaining this success; often these approaches
emphasize different elements, such as the importance of socioeconomic or insti-
tutional variables. The most widely disseminated and comprehensive one of
these approaches that explore the success of populist parties is an analysis of
demand and supply on the micro and macro scales. This approach includes vari-
ous levels of analysis, showing at the same time the connections and dependen-
cies between them. In this model, many determinants of the studied phenome-
non are considered, including the processes occurring within social structures,
the specificity and dynamics of a party system, institutional conditions ( such as
the electoral system ), characteristics of voters of a given party, as well as the
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organization and strategies of political parties.28 Considering that the causes of
the success of populist parties are very complex, this article aims to discuss only
those aspects which are the most essential for, and apply specifically to, SRP and
the LPR. 
1. The Socio - Political Climate
The socio - economic and political changes occurring in Poland during the period
of political transition were key factors for the rise of populist parties. Social
groups which objectively or subjectively lost something as a result of the regime
change began to show signs of disappointment, disorientation, uncertainty, fear,
and frustration. The negative moods generated, in terms of demand, society’s
vulnerability to populist slogans; in terms of supply, on the other hand, they con-
stituted arguments on whose basis the populist parties could build their criticism
of the status quo. A peculiar climate was formed, in which the attractiveness of
what the populists had to offer steadily grew – and with it grew the willingness of
the people to vote for these parties.29
The atmosphere of social dissatisfaction in Poland at the beginning of the
twenty - first century was largely influenced by the high level of political instability
existing on the Polish political scene since the early 1990s; it was also caused by
a lack of desired socio - economic reforms and of professional, responsible poli-
tics. Society’s dissatisfaction with the AWS - Freedom Union government coali-
tion was accompanied by the actual economic situation in the country, which
had been getting worse since the end of the 1990s. Among other things, Poland’s
gross nation product ( GNP ) was falling, while unemployment was increasing at
a rapid rate ( see Table 3).
All of this had an indubitable effect on increasing feelings of social insecurity
and resulted in a more pessimistic appraisal of the country’s economic situation
in the first years of the new millennium.30 Extremely negative appraisals of the
political elites also added to the atmosphere of dissatisfaction; they were seen as
irresponsible and corrupt. In effect, this created fertile ground for parties that
criticized and protested against the existing situation.
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31 Until 1999, the level of the people’s dissatisfaction with the country’s political situation
( people describing the political situation as “bad” ) had been stable at 30 per cent. It
rose to 50 per cent in 2000. In 2000–2001 it increased periodically to 65 per cent,
while in 2005 it reached its highest level, peaking at over 70 per cent. At the same
time, the number of people perceiving the existing political situation as “good” was at
a level of 20 per cent in 1998, dropping to less than 10 per cent in 2000, then to below
5 per cent in 2005. See : Nastroje społeczne w kwietniu, Komunikat Badań CBOS,
Warszawa, April 2005, pp. 4–5.
32 See Ocena skutków przystąpienia Polski do UE po trzech latach członkostwa,
Komunikat z badań CBOS, Warszawa, April 2007, p. 2.
Table 3: The Dynamics of the GNP ( fixed prices, previous year = 100) and un -
employment rate in the years 1995–2006
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Growth of GNP 
( in percentage )
4.4 4.1 4.3 1.2 1.4 3.9 5.3 3.6
Unemployment rate 
( in percentage )
10.0 13.0 16.1 18.3 19.9 19.6 19.0 17.6
Source : Quarterly National Accounts, 2009, vol. 4, OECD, Paris 2009, p. 11; Rocznik
Statystyczny Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej ( Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Poland )
2002, Warsawa 2002, p. 733; Rocznik Statystyczny Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, 2007,
Warsaw 2007, p. 875.
Between 2001 and 2005, numerous corruption scandals were revealed, impli-
cating certain politicians from the then - ruling Democratic Left Alliance ( SLD ).
Thus, in spite of a minimally improving economic situation ( see Table 1), the
social mood just before the 2005 elections was very unfavorable to the political
elites. During the entire period in which the populists were successful
(2001–2005), and especially in 2005, public opinion polls indicated a very high
degree of social dissatisfaction with the country’s political situation and increas-
ing distrust of politicians.31
Another very “hot” issue in Polish politics at the turn of the century was that
of accession to the EU. Up to 1998, this issue had not been significant. However,
the process of finalizing accession negotiations, as well as the imminence of the
accession date, made the issue a weighty one in political discourse. In such an
atmosphere, a camp of Eurosceptics emerged, whose main representatives were
the LPR and SRP. Public opinion polls indicated that between 1998 and 2001
the percentage of Poles opposing European integration also rose ( from just
under 20 per cent to over 30 per cent ).32
The boom which the Eurosceptical populist parties experienced decreased
slightly in 2005, as the number of opponents to European integration dimin-
ished by a few percentage points and the number of its proponents rose.33
Despite all of this, the significance of the Eurosceptical electorate could still be
discerned. Furthermore, the one - year membership of Poland in the EU still
failed to provide a basis for a clear comparison of gains and losses, which in turn
made it impossible to verify the populists’ gloomy predictions regarding the con-
sequences of Poland’s membership in the EU.
2. The Structure of the Polish Party System and Models of Political
Competition
Prior to the parliamentary elections of 2001, the Polish political scene under-
went essential structural changes that were favorable to the emergence of new
political parties. The Solidarity Electoral Action – AWS – and its block of rightist
parties, created in 1996, disintegrated in 2000. With this, the stable alliance of
four dominant political groups, composed of two party blocks based on the right-
wing, post - Solidarity AWS coalition and the liberal Freedom Union ( on the one
hand ) and the post - Communist SLD and Polish People’s Party – PSL ( on the
other ) also broke down. 
On the political scene, especially to its right, there was now a vast, unoccu-
pied space. At this time, in addition to the LPR, other groups materialized from
the breakdown within the AWS; the most important ones included the liberal
Civic Platform ( PO ), the conservative Law and Justice ( PiS ), and the Solidarity
Electoral Action of the Right ( AWSP ). The numerous new groups began to rival
with each other on the right wing. The radically populist Self Defence proved to
be a strong competitor for the agrarian PSL, both groups fighting for the peasant
electorate. In contrast to the elections of 1997, the political competition in 2001
had a tri - polar character. The main political forces were the post-Solidarity Right
( PO, PiS ), the post - Communist SLD and PSL, as well as SRP and the LPR –
groups which completely negated the achievements of the Third Polish Republic
government, in terms of both domestic and foreign politics.34
The political order of 2001, which had been favorable to parties located on
the periphery of the party system, underwent certain transformations before the
following parliamentary elections in 2005. The first breakdown of the SLD since
1989 weakened and split even further the left side of the Polish political scene.35
Thus, the creation of a ruling coalition between PiS and the PO – which had
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been a work - in - progress for some time before the 2005 elections as an alterna-
tive to the compromised Left – was put in question. Since they seemed to lack a
rival, both parties turned against each other in the final phase of the political
campaigns. Because both groups appealed to rightist values and had emerged
from the post - Solidarity camp, their confrontation was based chiefly on issues of
economics ( the “solidaristic and social” option versus the “liberal” one ) and con-
cerned the state’s role in the life of society. Competing for a disappointed leftist
electorate, PiS displayed itself as a more social party. On the other hand, the
party radicalized its attitude toward the issue of values, thus giving a nod to
Radio Maryja.36 Yet despite the fact that Father Rydzyk’s broadcasting station
essentially supported PiS, it still showed a “neutral” favoritism for the LPR. It is
worth emphasizing that the members of parliament most trusted by Father
Rydzyk all ran as representatives of the LPR for the elections.
The resulting situation, with two large parties confronting each other, did
nothing to benefit small parties operating on the peripheries of the parliamen-
tary scene. In spite of this, both groups ( SRP and LPR ) managed to maintain the
support they had received in the previous parliamentary elections, which in
2006 gave them the opportunity to create a coalition with PiS and thus to enter
the very center of the political scene.
3. The Position of SRP and the LPR as Peripheral Parties
The majority of leaders of political groups that emerged at the start of the new
millennium had already been politically active within the Post - Solidarity move-
ment, a counterweight against the Post - Communist camp. The LPR and Self
Defence were the only groups which had not emerged either from Solidarity or
from Post - Communist traditions.37 This allowed the two parties, in the 2001 and
2005 elections, to express their disapproval of both the leftist and rightist ruling
elites; they presented themselves as the only groups not “soiled” by power, as
defenders of the national interest and of common citizens.
In 2001, with the help of Radio Maryja and Catholic magazines, the LPR ran
a campaign under the slogan of defending the national - Catholic interests of the
Polish people.38 Nevertheless, the dominant theme of the LPR’s campaign was
objection against Poland’s accession to the EU. SRP, meanwhile, presented itself
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mainly as a defender of the interests of all working people, the weak, and the
needy. Lepper appealed to farmers by presenting himself as their advocate. 
In 2005 both the LPR and SRP described themselves as the only possible
alternative to the post - Communists and liberals, to the Round Table order, and
as political forces worthy of the people’s trust. At the same time they positioned
themselves against the “caste of the untouchables” – the political elites which
had governed Poland up to that time.39 Despite these similarities between the
parties, we should stress that it was the LPR that made fighting against corrup-
tion and bad government its priority. It demanded the resolution of political
scandals and of privatization. SRP’s campaign, meanwhile, was based mostly on
socioeconomic issues. Lepper painted his vision of a Poland as pro - social, pro -
societal, anti - liberal, and a defender of the poor and unemployed.
The populist strategy of both parties, based on vertical and horizontal exclu-
sion, turned out to be very effective, as shown by the election results of 2001 and
2005.
Both SRP and the LPR attracted voters who had somehow “lost” in the
process of political transformation, largely those for whom it was difficult to
adapt to rapidly - occurring socioeconomic changes, and those who were claim -
oriented. Both parties’ electorates were dominated by older individuals, having a
vocational or merely elementary level of education, living in villages or small
towns. The LPR was especially supported by highly religious voters, as well as
those tied to traditional forms of cultural orientation.40 SRP found its greatest
support in environments that made up its natural electorate – among farmers.
The unemployed, workers, retired individuals, and pensioners could also be
found among its electorate. It must be emphasized, moreover, that the elec-
torates of both SRP and the LPR were characterized by Eurosceptical attitudes.
4. The European Elections of 2004 – The Triumph of the LPR
The elections to the European parliament in 2004 confirmed both parties’
strong positions in the political arena. It was a great surprise that LPR’s election
result in 2004 (15.92 per cent ) was almost twice as high as that of three years
earlier; consequently, the LPR found itself in second place, following the Civic
Platform (24.10 per cent ). Self Defence increased its level of support only slightly
if compared to the parliamentary elections of 2001, earning 10.78 per cent of
votes.
It seems that the success of both parties in the elections to the European
Parliament was the result of a “wave effect” of populist success with both
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national and local elections.41 The defining trait of the European Parliamentary
elections, confirmed by the election in 2004, was the dominance of national
issues over European ones in the campaigns. Even the discussion concerning the
Constitutional Treaty, which was supposed to be signed on the weekend follow-
ing the elections, was reflected in the campaigns only to a minimum degree. The
political and economic situation, together with the general mood of the society
(none of which had really improved since 2001)42 mobilized much of the sup-
port for SRP and the LPR. Moreover, since the beginning of 2004 the percent-
age of those opposing European integration had been growing again; in mid -
2004 it reached 30 per cent.43 This made it possible for the parties to continue
their populist, anti - European course in politics. This approach was exploited
especially by the LPR which, in contrast to SRP, remained unchangeable in its
hard, Eurosceptical position; it was the only political party that tried to take full
advantage of the European issue in its campaign for the European Parliament.
The significant difference in the growth of support for the groups under analy-
sis may be linked to a record low in voter turnout (20.87 per cent ). In effect, it
seems that the religious electorate of the League was more disciplined and moti-
vated than that of the SRP.44 Studies have shown that those that went to the bal-
lot boxes were, for the most part, potential supporters of the League of Polish
Families. In contrast, supporters of Self Defence went to cast their vote much
more rarely.
III. The Fall
In July 2007, following the crisis in the government coalition, SRP and the LPR
were no longer co - leading political parties. Defeated in the parliamentary elec-
tions in October that year, they also lost their parliamentary status. For politi-
cians in both parties this seemed like exile from paradise : they lost everything
that they had worked so hard to gain for six years, and which they had main-
tained in the wake of the elections of 2005. It can be said that their brief history
came full - circle : they were back at the starting point, again becoming radical
groups on the periphery of the political scene. This situation was illustrated, in
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some way, by the changes in the LPR’s logo. On 8 July 2006, during the party
congress, the decision was made to resign from the symbol that had been used
up to that time : an eagle with a cross on its breast. Roman Giertych, the party
leader, justified the change this way : “We are changing the sign because Poland
is changing. From a radical party born out of opposition against injustice, it is
now becoming a responsible government force. We are changing ourselves in
order to change Poland.”45 On 20 December 2009, as a political party now out-
side the parliament, the LPR decided to return to its old emblem,46 thus return-
ing to its source.
The causes of the defeat of the Polish populists were as complex as the causes
of their success. To some degree these causes were mirror images of each other,
in the sense that the defeat was caused by the expiration of conditions and cir-
cumstances that had allowed the LPR to both enter the parliament in 2001 and
to achieve the status of a ruling party in 2005.
The party’s attempt at returning to the game by running in the 2009 elections
to the European Parliament was a complete failure and only confirmed their sta-
tus as “defeated”. The elections to the EP were a veritable “Waterloo” for SRP
and the LPR – a last, futile effort in a situation when they were lacking both
armies and ammunition. These elections were second - order to the uphill battle
the parties had fought in 2007. Thus it seems that the circumstances of the 2009
elections should be discussed separately, emphasizing at the same time that the
main causes of that defeat were secondary to the causes of the defeat in the 2007
parliamentary elections.
1. The Socio - Political Climate
As previously stated, the 2007 elections occurred in a social climate being totally
different from the previous two elections (2001 and 2005). We can say that the
weather radically worsened for the populists. As explained above, both parties
(especially SRP ) had been building their success on social dissatisfaction.
Unemployment levels, being one of the primary causes of society’s frustration
and fear – especially with reference to groups of the lowest economic status –
dynamically decreased in 2007, as was noted in the election year ( see table 4).
In such a climate, the general level of optimism in society rose,47 while groups
discarded and threatened with exclusion from society became much smaller.
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Table 4: Unemployment rate in Poland in the years 2004–2007
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007
Growth of
GNP ( in per-
centage )
5.3 3.6 6.3 6.8
Unemploy-
ment rate
(in percen-
tage )
19.0 17.6 14.8
1st Q 2007 2nd Q 2007 3rd Q 2007 4th Q 2007
14.3 12.3 11.6 11.2
Source : Quarterly National Accounts, 2009, vol. 4, OECD, Paris 2009, p. 11; Rocznik
Statystyczny Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej 2008, Warsaw 2008, p. 242.
SRP and the LPR lost the ability to base their politics on social unhappiness.
Although the government under Jarosław Kaczyński tried to take credit for the
improving economic situation,48 any attempts made by SRP and the LPR to dis-
count Kaczyński’s government in their own interest were practically useless, as
these parties had no influence on the government’s actions in the field of eco-
nomics. In spite of the improving economic situation, after one year of the gov-
ernment coalition’s existence only 1 percent of Poles judged the coalition to be
“decidedly good”, and only 22 per cent declared it was “rather good”.49 It seems
that PiS managed to place the blame for an unstable government on its smaller
coalition fellows and thus convinced the Polish people that it could govern better
without its bothersome colleagues. This idea was supported by ratings of SRP
and the LPR, which were falling despite the fact that PiS’s ratings remained sta-
ble.50
Poland’s accession to the EU in 2004 brought certain essential implications
for the populist parties. In contrast to the 2005 elections, during which the
advantages of EU accession were still obscured, by the 2007 elections it had
become very clear that Poland had gained much by its accession, with Polish
farmers constituting the greatest beneficiaries. This may explain the surprisingly
large percentage (14 per cent ) of the SRP electorate voting for the PO in 2007.
In 2007 and 2009, moreover, the Poles’ support for EU membership reached a
record high level of 75–80 per cent. We may assume that because SRP and the
LPR were still perceived as Eurosceptical, they lost considerable power in influ-
encing the electorate; what is more, they showed themselves to be completely
untrustworthy in the eyes of much of their electorate from 2005.51
2. The Status of SRP and the LPR as Government Parties
We can risk stating that the defeat of SRP and the LPR had been inscribed into
their success. Their entrance into the center of the political scene ( into the gov-
ernment ) meant that they lost the primary plain on which they had constructed
their identity – vertical and horizontal exclusion. Under the new circumstances
both parties tried to change things such as their ideological principles ( LPR ) and
their image ( Self Defense ). LPR wanted to move closer in the direction of
Catholic - conservative positions, discarding certain radical points from its pro-
gram ( such as its xenophobic Euroscepticism ). Furthermore, its participation in
the government forced the LPR to conduct de facto pro - European politics. The
party could no longer mobilize its electorate on the basis of nationalism and
Euroscepticism. What became more important for SRP, once Lepper had
entered the political arena as a deputy - prime minister, was the fact that it had
lost the possibility of criticizing the political establishment. The politicians of Self
Defence also tried to change their party’s image, moving away from the label of
“political brawlers”.
Nevertheless, in the case of both parties, such image conversion met with
great disbelief. As both parties disposed of their radical criticism of the existing
status quo, they lost a key element of their identities which they could not
replace. Both Giertych ( as “the good European” ) and Lepper ( as “the states-
man” ) became rather caricatures of themselves than credible government politi-
cians.
3. Structures of the Polish Party System and Models of Political Competition
The electoral campaign of 2007 was dominated by a bipolar competition
between PiS and the Civic Platform ( PO ). The main axis of the division that both
parties were creating already became visible in the 2005 elections. This became
even more obvious two years later, overshadowing any other political divisions.
PiS tried to convince people that the battle was being fought between two
visions: a “solidarity Poland” as envisioned by PiS, and a “liberal Poland” as
imagined by the PO. In turn, the PO tried to convince voters that the conflict
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concerned different visions of conducting politics : the conflict and lack of trust
inherent in PiS versus the love and cooperation within the PO.52
The 2007 elections to some degree took on the form of a referendum : voters
were either for the PO or for PiS. In this atmosphere attempts made at reviving
divisions based on criticism of the establishment ( SRP ) or on nationalism ( LPR )
failed to find susceptible social ground. It can be said that a situation arose in the
2007 elections in which the two giants ( PiS and the PO ), while fighting each
other, crushed the remainder of the political groups. The victims of this struggle
were not only SRP and the LPR, but also the SLD.53
The above given variables were decisive for essential changes in the attitudes
of the electorate. Just after creating its government coalition with SRP and the
LPR, PiS took actions directed toward reduce the role of its allies; in the long run
its aim was to take over their electorate. This process, known as “eating appetiz-
ers”, ended with questionable success. Indeed, PiS was able to eliminate both
parties, but it grabbed only a part of their electorate – not even half of the LPR’s
electorate from 2005 and only a quarter of Self Defence’s electorate.
Interestingly enough, the PO also managed to break off a small part of the elec-
torate of the populists in the 2005 elections – 8.6 per cent from the LPR and 14
per cent from Self Defence.54
4. The European Elections of 2009 – The Straw that Broke the Camel’s Back
The Elections to the European Parliament in 2009 proved to be the “the straw
that broke the camel’s back” for the Polish populist groups. After the 2007 elec-
tions, SRP, as a political party outside the parliament, suffered complete disinte-
gration. Political and ethical scandals, along with quarrels among its former lead-
ers, brought the party to the verge of political nonexistence.55 Standing on top of
the ruins of his political party, Lepper tried to take advantage of the
Euroelections as a means of returning to politics. Yet SRP was left without finan-
cial resources; its populist slogans, that once again referred to criticism of the
establishment,56 failed to sound credible, coming from a former vice - Marshal of
the Sejm and vice - prime minister.
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Although one of the polls commissioned by the newspaper “Rzeczpospolita”
in early June indicated a growth of support for SRP,57 ultimately the party earned
a mere 1.46 per cent of votes ( see table 5), which did not result in any mandates.
LPR activists did not even run in the elections to the EP under their own
party’s name; the LPR had become a party with divisions. The main part of the
party, loyal to Roman Giertych, strengthened the Polish branch of Libertas, a
Europe - wide movement founded by the Irish millionaire Declan Ganley.
Another group of activists in conflict with Giertych joined former vice - Marshal
Janusz Dobrosz to form the Social Movement Forward Poland ( Ruch Społeczny
Naprzód Polsko ) in October 2008. Dobrosz ran in the elections in a coalition
with the small and insignificant “Piast” Party ( Stronnictwo Piast ). Their results
in the elections to the EP (0.02 per cent ) perfectly reflected their political weak-
ness.
The fact that the Polish branch of Libertas was dominated by LPR politicians
was a kind of paradox, considering that Ganley himself did not want to be
labeled a “Eurosceptic”.58 The starkly Eurosceptical position of the Polish politi-
cians in Libertas contradicted Ganley’s seemingly pro - European declarations.
The contradiction was not resolved by placing several pro - European politicians
on the election slate of the Polish Libertas.59 Such a strategy only deepened the
illegibility of the formation’s profile; the strategy was dubious in the eyes of both
the pro - European and Eurosceptical electorate. It made the party vulnerable to
attacks by other Eurosceptical circles and from PiS.60 There was a widespread
opinion that the only reason for Ganley’s decision to hand over the Libertas sign-
board to politicians of the LPR was the fact that the League held a dominant
place in Public Television : the head of Polish Television ( TVP ) was Piotr Farfał,
a former LPR politician and close associate of Roman Giertych.61 Ultimately,
however, neither the extraordinary friendliness to Libertas, shown by Polish
Public Television, nor the fact that Declan Ganley managed to pull the legend of
“Solidarity” – former Polish President Lech Wałęsa62 – into his campaign for
election, brought the anticipated results. Libertas received a mere 1.14 per cent
of voters’ support.
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Table 5: Results achieved by Polish populist groups in the 2009 elections to the
European Parliament
Slate number Group name Percentage of votes
3 Self Defence 1.6
5 Libertas* 1.4
12 Forward Poland – Piast* 0.2
* Groups created by LPR activists. 
Source : The State Election Committee ( Państwowa Komisja Wyborcza ), www.pkw.gov.pl.
Besides the basic causes of the populists’ defeat, which already became visible
during the parliamentary elections of 2007, some additional causes made them-
selves known in the elections to the EP in 2009 :
– financial weakness, resulting from the groups’ status outside the parliament
(they did not receive budget grants );
– competition from PiS, which effectively took control of the position of a
“defender of the Polish national interest”. After it had lost power in 2007, PiS
clearly moved into the position of an “unhappy” entity in respect of European
issues and heightened its populist rhetoric.
Two additional factors were also of essential significance for Libertas and “For -
ward Poland” :
– A lack of support from the Catholic - national Radio Maryja, which not only
failed to support the formations established by LPR politicians but actually
fought against them ( especially Libertas.)63 The populist electorate to a large
degree supported PiS, in line with Father Rydzyk’s open persuasions.
– Contradictions in the election campaigns, which were most evident in the
case of Libertas.
IV. Conclusions
It seems that the story of the two Polish populist parties – SRP and the LPR – has
come to an end. Their return to big ( parliamentary ) politics in the future can not
be ruled out, but it is very improbable. The significance of these two formations
on the Polish political stage is mainly due to the fact that, like no other parties in
Poland, these groups showed features that allowed for defining them as populist
parties. As mentioned before, populist traits have been attributed to various par-
ties in the past ( PSL, KPN ), and without a doubt they will continue to be
ascribed to other groups existing now or in the future ( it is worth noting that the
populist label has been increasingly attached to PiS ). 
However, if we accept that a populist party, by definition, must make use of
both vertical and horizontal exclusion, then as yet only SRP and the LPR can be
truly defined as populist parties. 
Both parties are populist independently of the fact that there are many signif-
icant differences between them. The fundamental difference lies in Self
Defence’s lack of a coherent ideological basis; its identity was based primarily on
vertical exclusion, with some features of horizontal exclusion. The LPR, in turn,
clearly showed characteristics of a radical right party with a developed ideologi-
cal structure; it bore the characteristics of horizontal exclusion to a greater
degree than those of vertical exclusion.
The conclusions stemming from the present analysis of the causes of the
Polish populist parties’ success and defeat can be summarized as follows : SRP
and the LPR achieved great success in 2001, thanks to particular circumstances
in which socioeconomic and political conditions were favorable for them. These
circumstances included, above all, a worsening situation on the job market and
the consequent negative mood of society. In such conditions, SRP and LPR were
able to take full advantage of their status as opposition parties not yet involved in
the complexities of governing. They managed to gain a great deal of political cap-
ital through harsh criticism of the establishment and by appealing to nationalist
and xenophobic sentiments in the debate on Poland’s accession to the EU.
The parties owed the maintenance of their positions on the political stage
(after the elections of 2005) to a still - unfavorable social climate, which largely
resulted from a wave of corruption scandals revealed when the SLD - PSL coali-
tion was in power. At this stage, there were still no benefits visible from Poland’s
membership in the EU, which made it difficult for voters to objectively evaluate
SRP and LPR’s Eurosceptical attitudes.
The situation changed at the time of the 2007 elections, definitely to the dis-
advantage of the populist parties. Economic revival, together with a rapidly
falling unemployment rate, ameliorated the social mood. SRP and LPR’s
entrance into the government coalition ended their status as parties of the
Opposition, a status that is essential for populists. Thus, from 2005 to 2007 the
parties found themselves having to legitimize the politics of the establishment of
which they were now a part. Additionally, Poland’s membership in the European
Union now began to bring palpable and concrete benefits, especially for the elec-
torate of SRP ( farmers ). This factor turned out to be equally unfortunate for the
LPR, as Eurosceptical attitudes in Polish society decreased drastically.
As we look at the two main variables that condition a “populist climate” in
Poland, it can be concluded that populist parties work best when the country’s
situation is at its worst ( when the economy is bad or the people’s trust in the
elites is low ), and only when the parties are in the Opposition. When populist
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parties come into the center of the political scene and at the same time the
socioeconomic situation in the country is improving, this mixture of circum-
stances becomes fatal to the parties themselves ( see Fig. 1). Frankly speaking,
the worse the conditions in the country, the better the conditions for populists. It
is vital for them not to have to take responsibility for governing, as otherwise
they lose their credibility and reveal the absurdity of their earlier postulates.
Thus, a paradox starts to occur : populist parties can remain true to them-
selves when they voice their politics, but not when they execute it. This can be a
basis for the more general claim that populist parties are meant to be, first and
foremost, political parties of the opposition; once this status is lost, they lose the
ability to criticize the establishment and its politics.
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Fig. 1 : The socioeconomic situation and placement along the Center - Periphery
axis as factors conditioning the ‘political climate’ for populist parties
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